The article deals with the problem of method for a bioethical approach to clinical cases from the standpoint of bioethics, and analyzes the various methodologies that exist, highlighting their contributions and strengths, as well as their difficulties. Tools for reflecting on how to implement a methodology adapted to the context of contemporary Mexican reality are provided as well. They underscore the characteristics particular to Mexico in bioethical analysis and discernment.

When events such as a pandemic occur, and the entire population’s health must be ensured, the focus is on public health. Despite several criteria for decision-making, it is advisable to delve into the weighting beyond the mere consideration of plainly visible factors. We propose weighting as a mechanism instead of chance since, given the person’s substantial unity and intrinsic dignity, their destiny cannot be subject to anything less than the exercise of intelligible judgment inherent to human reason.

This literature review focused on effective teaching strategies for children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) in classrooms where English as a Foreign Language (EFL) is taught, which is undoubtedly a novel and crucial issue that demands immediate attention. This review not only concentrates on identifying the teaching strategies used for students with ADHD but also delves into and considers different teaching approaches and inclusive education adaptations for students with ADHD. The impact of this review might be significant for educators, (...) parents, and stakeholders alike since it could provide valuable recommendations and knowledge based on the evidence gathered. This would lead to developing more effective, efficient, and inclusive teaching strategies or mechanisms for students with ADHD. Programs aimed at teacher training could also benefit from the findings of this review, contributing to the general support and improving the academic experience of students with ADHD in foreign language learning environments. (shrink)

El artículo aborda la relación entre la bioética y la ideología de género a partir de la noción de vulnerabilidad. Así, se afirma que la segunda pone a la persona en una situación de mayor vulnerabilidad al carecer de un fundamento ontológico que la sostenga y, por ende, pudieran desprenderse, de esto, prácticas poco éticas para con quienes se engloban dentro de alguno de los grupos residuales de la misma. Se parte, por tanto, del origen de la ideología de género (...) para, posteriormente, ubicar las problemáticas más frecuentes que se presentan, en el terreno de la Bioética, a partir de la vulnerabilidad antropológica y social. Por último se rescata el papel de la Bioética en la intervención de las poblaciones vulnerables y vulneradas en el marco del tema del género. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Through the analysis of the studies developed by Mikhail Bakhtin regarding the work of Fyodor Dostoevsky and François Rabelais, this article aims to discuss the boundaries and the relationship between corpus and object. Therefore, we compared two Brazilian editions of Bakhtinian works, with the research on the French author and popular comic culture, with a set of texts involving the Russian original, frame-texts, translations, and other correlated utterances. The reflection is based on a dialogical perspective, particularly on the notion (...) of alterity. The results show that, although corpus and object are a priori amalgamated, it is the essential relationship of the author-researcher with this corpus that gradually detached the object. RESUMO Por meio da análise dos estudos desenvolvidos por Mikhail Bakhtin a propósito da obra de Fiódor Dostoiévski e François Rabelais, este artigo visa discutir as fronteiras e a relação entre corpus e objeto. Para tanto, observamos comparativamente duas edições brasileiras das obras bakhtinianas, sendo a pesquisa a respeito do autor francês e da cultura cômica popular cotejada com um conjunto de textos envolvendo o original em russo, textos-moldura, traduções e outros enunciados correlacionados. A reflexão apoia-se em uma perspectiva dialógica, sobretudo na noção de alteridade. Os resultados revelam que, ainda que corpus e objeto se apresentem a priori amalgamados, é a imprescindível relação do autor-pesquisador com esse corpus que vai, gradualmente, destacando o objeto. (shrink)

RESUMO Por meio da análise dos estudos desenvolvidos por Mikhail Bakhtin a propósito da obra de Fiódor Dostoiévski e François Rabelais, este artigo visa discutir as fronteiras e a relação entre corpus e objeto. Para tanto, observamos comparativamente duas edições brasileiras das obras bakhtinianas, sendo a pesquisa a respeito do autor francês e da cultura cômica popular cotejada com um conjunto de textos envolvendo o original em russo, textos-moldura, traduções e outros enunciados correlacionados. A reflexão apoia-se em uma perspectiva dialógica, (...) sobretudo na noção de alteridade. Os resultados revelam que, ainda que corpus e objeto se apresentem a priori amalgamados, é a imprescindível relação do autor-pesquisador com esse corpus que vai, gradualmente, destacando o objeto. ABSTRACT Through the analysis of the studies developed by Mikhail Bakhtin regarding the work of Fyodor Dostoevsky and François Rabelais, this article aims to discuss the boundaries and the relationship between corpus and object. Therefore, we compared two Brazilian editions of Bakhtinian works, with the research on the French author and popular comic culture, with a set of texts involving the Russian original, frame-texts, translations, and other correlated utterances. The reflection is based on a dialogical perspective, particularly on the notion of alterity. The results show that, although corpus and object are a priori amalgamated, it is the essential relationship of the author-researcher with this corpus that gradually detached the object. (shrink)

This study aims are to compare the characteristics of the Greek Polis of Metaponto and Poseidonia water collecting and distribution systems. And also, display the differences and similarities between the water management systems used, as to better understand the criteria developed to orientate the place of settlements and also of certain urban characteristics chosen by the Greeks, between the VIII and IV centuries B.C.

This article argues that the social constructivist paradigm falls into the same dualistic trap as biological essentialism when attempting to respond to questions of gender and sexuality. I argue that social constructivism, like biological determinism, presumes a ‘split’ world, where subjective lived experiences are separated from the world of socio-cultural forces. Following a phenomenological approach, grounded in Merleau-Ponty’s ontological view of the body, this article attempts to move beyond the dualistic metadiscourses of social constructivism in maintaining that identity is a (...) fully embodied process. I see gender and sexuality as necessarily embodied and corporeally constituted. In the light of this, I propose an understanding of gender and sexuality that focuses on the centrality of the body as open project. This approach sees gender and sexuality as embodied processes that are enmeshed with the complex fabric of lived everyday experiences and concurrent socio-cultural and historical processes. Drawing on real-life examples, I conclude that gender and sexual embodiment are not one-dimensional according to a binary system of male versus female. Rather, given the documented experience of the indeterminacy and ambiguity of human existence, there are a variety of possible embodiments of humankind. (shrink)

O artigo visa a analisar como a Psicologia tem encarado os desafios colocados pelo desempenho escolar. Discute os princípios e as ferramentas q ue têm orientado as práticas psicológicas no campo do fracasso escolar. Faz um debate acerca da interface Psicologia e Educação, partindo dos princípios da ..

O nosso intuito é problematizar o ensino da filosofia como uma disciplina a ser aprendida. Pretendemos desta forma, trazer questões que possam auxiliar a nossa investigação para uma solução coerente e satisfatória. Para isso, retomaremos alguns conceitos gregos de educação, focando-nos no séc. V a.C. através da tragédia e da sofística para demonstrar a influência destas dentro daquilo que chamamos educação. Se tomarmos o mestre como o artífice e o discípulo como objeto deste ensino, devemos ter em mente que a (...) arte de ensinar é conveniente ao discípulo e não ao mestre. O mestre, portanto, é instrumento para que se possa ensinar tal arte ao discípulo. O objetivo deste trabalho é refletir o ensino, seu instrumento e seu objeto com o intuito de repensar o caminho da filosofia na educação. Para isso, iremos nos apoiar nos conceitos paidéuticos na formação do homem grego da Grécia Clássica. Palavras-chave: Educação. Filosofia. Educação. Tragédia. Sofística. Homem Grego. (shrink)

Apresenta investigação sobre a relação entre a Representação da Informação e a Dialética, demonstrando que enquanto campos de estudos podem contribuir para um repensar da forma como o conhecimento pode se estabelecer. Traz como questão-chave: Por qual motivo devemos fazer uso dos princípios que regem a Dialética para representar cibercordéis? Para responder a esse problema de pesquisa, tem-se como objetivo geral: Apresentar a Dialética como uma proposta teórico-metodológica capaz de auxiliar no processo de Representação da Informação de cibercordéis. Metodologicamente, a (...) investigação é qualitativa, trazendo como a abordagem o próprio Campo da Dialética e corpus, os Cordéis Digitais (cibercordéis) presentes em grupos de facebook com buscas orientadas pela hashtag cordel (#cordel). Nos resultados identificou-se a presença de 8 (oito) Marcadores Sociais, a saber: Classe Social, Étnico-racial, Gênero, Geração, Nacionalidade, Regionalidade, Religião e Sexualidade. Uma vez categorizados, com a análise dos dados, foi possível melhorar o processo de Representação da Informação através do uso do princípio da contradição, por exemplo, e assim, tornar a prática informacional mais robusta e eficaz. Nas conclusões, foi possível chegar a um posicionamento basilar para podermos compreender a ideia do que é Representação Dialética da Informação, especialmente, se tomado como ponto de apoio e partida, princípios como os da contradição e o da totalidade. (shrink)

Are there nonexistent objects, i.e., objects that do not exist? Some examples often cited are: Zeus, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes, Vulcan (the hypothetical planet postulated by the 19th century astronomer Le Verrier), the perpetual motion machine, the golden mountain, the fountain of youth, the round square, etc. Some important philosophers have thought that the very concept of a nonexistent object is contradictory (Hume) or logically ill-formed (Kant, Frege), while others (Leibniz, Meinong, the Russell of Principles of Mathematics) have embraced it wholeheartedly. (...) This entry is an examination of the many questions which arise in connection with the view that there are nonexistent objects. The following are particularly salient: What reasons are there (if any) for thinking that there are nonexistent objects? If there are nonexistent objects, then what kind of objects are they? How can they be characterized? Is it possible to provide a consistent theory of nonexistent objects? What is the explanatory force of a consistent theory of nonexistent objects (if such a thing is possible)? (shrink)

In Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit entwickelt Meinong seine Theorie der unvollständigen Gegenstände. Der Begriff der Unvollständigkeit wird eingeführt mittels expliziter Bezugnahme auf den Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten: Ein Gegenstand ist unvollständig genau dann, wenn für ihn der Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten nicht gilt. M. a. W.: x ist unvollständig, wenn nicht für jede Eigenschaft P gilt, daß x P hat oder daß x P nicht hat. Alle existierenden und bestehenden Gegenstände sind vollständig; Gegenstände wie das Dreieck in abstracto oder der (...) Gegenstand etwas Blaues sollen dagegen unvollständig sein. Meinong unterscheidet zwei Arten der Negation:(Ne) Es ist nicht der Fall, daß x p hat. (Externe Negation)(Ni) X hat nicht-P (Interne Negation)Meinong selbst stellt fest, daß in bezug auf die externe Negation der Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten uneingeschränkt gültig ist. Um zu verstehen, was es heißt, daß ein Gegenstand unvollständig ist, erscheint es daher unumgänglich, Klarheit darüber zu gewinnen, was eigentlich mit der internen Negation zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Es wird eine Interpretation der internen Negation vorgeschlagen, und es soll gezeigt werden, daß es gemäß dieser Interpretation überhaupt keine Gegenstände gibt, die unvollständig im Sinne Meinongs sind. (shrink)

No two individuals with the autism diagnosis are ever the same—yet many practitioners and parents can recognize signs of ASD very rapidly with the naked eye. What, then, is this phenotype of autism that shows itself across such distinct clinical presentations and heterogeneous developments? The “signs” seem notoriously slippery and resistant to the behavioral threshold categories that make up current assessment tools. Part of the problem is that cognitive and behavioral “abilities” typically are theorized as high-level disembodied and modular functions—that (...) are assessed discretely (impaired, normal, enhanced) to define a spectral syndrome. Even as biology reminds us that organic developing bodies are not made up of independent switches, we remain often seduced by the simplicity of mechanistic and cognitive models. Developmental disorders such as autism have accordingly been theorized as due to different modular dysfunctions—typically of cortical origin, i.e., failures of “theory of mind” (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), of the “mirror neuron system” (Ramachandran and Oberman, 2006), of “weak central coherence” (Happe and Frith, 2006) or of the balance of “empathizing” and “systemizing” (Baron-Cohen, 2009), just to list a few. -/- The broad array of autonomic (Ming et al., 2005; Cheshire, 2012) and sensorimotor (Damasio and Maurer, 1978; Maurer and Damasio, 1982; Donnellan and Leary, 1995; Leary and Hill, 1996; Donnellan and Leary, 2012; Donnellan et al., 2012) differences experienced and reported by people with autism have by such theories typically been sidelined as “co-morbidities,” possibly sharing genetic causes, but rendered as incidental and decisively behaviorally irrelevant symptoms—surely disconnected from cognition. But what if the development of cortically based mental processes and autonomous control relies on the complexities and proper function of the peripheral nervous systems? Through such an “embodied” lens the heterogeneous symptoms of autism invites new interpretations. We propose here that many behavioral-level findings can be re-defined as downstream effects of how developing nervous systems attempt to cope and adapt to the challenges of having various noisy, unpredictable, and unreliable peripheral inputs. (shrink)

Thinking of problems of aesthetics has a long and strong tradition in Austrian Philosophy. It starts with Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848); it is famously represented by the critic and musicologist Eduard Hanslick (1825-1904); and it is continued within the school of Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), in particular by Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932) and Stephan Witasek (1870-1915). Nowadays the aesthetic writings of Bolzano, Ehrenfels, and Witasek are hardly known, particularly not in the Anglo-Saxon world. Austrian aesthetics is surely less known than Austrian contributions (...) to other philosophical disciplines, like ontology, epistemology or philosophy of science. One of the aims of this paper is to show that this is both regrettable and unjustified for the following reasons: Austrian aestheticians have dealt with a number of problems (mainly concerning the foundations of aesthetics) that are salient until today; in terms of subtlety and depth as well as exactness and originality, in general, they easily stand comparison with today's analytic aesthetics; and many of there views and arguments are still worthy of consideration. In this paper, the focus is on a number of hardly known Austrian contributions to aesthetics. These contributions concern the following, partly interrelated, central problems of philosophical aesthetics: i. The problem of the definition of beauty (What is beauty? What does it mean to say of an object that it is beautiful?) ii. The problem of the ontological status of works of art (What kinds of objects are works of art?) iii. The problem of the objectivity of aesthetic values (Do we claim objective validity for aesthetic value judgements, and if so, is this claim justified?) The answers of Bolzano, Meinong, Witasek and Ehrenfels to these questions will be considered. (shrink)

States of affairs raise, among others, the following questions: What kind of entity are they (if there are any)? Are they contingent, causally efficacious, spatio-temporal and perceivable entities, or are they abstract objects? What are their constituents and their identity conditions? What are the functions that states of affairs are able to fulfil in a viable theory, and which problems and prima facie counterintuitive consequences arise out of an ontological commitment to them? Are there merely possible (non-actual, non-obtaining) states of (...) affairs? Are there molecular (i.e., negative, conjunctive, disjunctive etc.) states of affairs? Are there modal and tensed states of affairs? In this volume, these and other questions are addressed by David M. Armstrong, Marian David, Herbert Hochberg, Uwe Meixner, L. Nathan Oaklander, Peter Simons, Erwin Tegtmeier and Mark Textor. (shrink)

Dieses Buch ist eine bewusst systematisch orientierte Einführung in die grundlegendsten Fragen der philosophischen Ästhetik. Es richtet sich in erster Linie an Studierende der Philosophie, aber auch an interessierte Laien und Vertreter/innen anderer Disziplinen. Zusammenfassungen, Übungsaufgaben und Literaturhinweise am Ende jedes Kapitels machen es auch für das Selbststudium geeignet. Aus dem Inhalt: I. Was ist philosophische Ästhetik? – Auf der Suche nach einer Definition der philosophischen Ästhetik – Die Gegenstände der philosophischen Ästhetik – Die Fragen der philosophischen Ästhetik – Die (...) Methoden der philosophischen Ästhetik II. Das ästhetische Erlebnis und die ästhetische Einstellung – Die Bestandteile ästhetischer Erlebnisse – Die subjektive und die objektive Erklärung der ästhetischen Erfahrung – Interesselosigkeit und psychische Distanz – Einwände gegen die Theorie der Interesselosigkeit und der psychischen Distanz III. Ästhetische Eigenschaften, ästhetische Werturteile und ästhetische Gegenstände – Ästhetische Eigenschaften und ästhetische Prädikate – Ästhetischer Realismus versus ästhetischer Anti-Realismus – Nonkognitivismus, Subjektivismus, Naturalismus – Das Erkennen ästhetischer Wertqualitäten IV. Die Ontologie des Kunstwerks – Was für eine Art von Gegenständen sind Kunstwerke? – Die Abstraktheit literarischer und musikalischer Werke – Sind Werke der bildenden Kunst materielle Gegenstände? – Fiktive Gegenstände und dargestellte Welten V. Was ist Kunst? – Die Darstellungstheorie – Die Ausdruckstheorie – Der kunstästhetische Formalismus – Die Institutionstheorie – Die Theorie der Familienähnlichkeit – Kunst als ästhetische Kommunikation. (shrink)

The current assessment of behaviors in the inventories to diagnose autism spectrum disorders (ASD) focus on observation and discrete categorizations. Behaviors require movements, yet measurements of physical movements are seldom included. Their inclusion however, could provide an objective characterization of behavior to help unveil interactions between the peripheral and the central nervous systems. Such interactions are critical for the development and maintenance of spontaneous autonomy, self-regulation and voluntary control. At present, current approaches cannot deal with the heterogeneous, dynamic and stochastic (...) nature of development. Accordingly, they leave no avenues for real-time or longitudinal assessments of change in a coping system continuously adapting and developing compensatory mechanisms. We offer a new unifying statistical framework to reveal re-afferent kinesthetic features of the individual with ASD. The new methodology is based on the non-stationary stochastic patterns of minute fluctuations (micro-movements) inherent to our natural actions. Such patterns of behavioral variability provide re-entrant sensory feedback contributing to the autonomous regulation and coordination of the motor output. From an early age, this feedback supports centrally driven volitional control and fluid, flexible transitions between intentional and spontaneous behaviors. We show that in ASD there is a disruption in the maturation of this form of proprioception. Despite this disturbance, each individual has unique adaptive compensatory capabilities that we can unveil and exploit to evoke faster and more accurate decisions. Measuring the kinesthetic re-afference in tandem with stimuli variations we can detect changes in their micro-movements indicative of a more predictive and reliable kinesthetic percept. Our methods address the heterogeneity of ASD with a personalized approach grounded in the inherent sensory-motor abilities that the individual has already developed. (shrink)

In this book, a general type ontology of works is defended and developed in detail. A wide concept of “work” is used here, such that “work” roughly corresponds to “artefact”. Though the focus is on works of art, the theory is meant to be applicable, in principle, to works of science and technology and to everyday items of all sorts as well. Among others, the following questions are discussed: To what ontological category or categories do works belong? Is there a (...) principled ontological divide between linguistic and musical works, on the one hand, and works of the visual arts on the other? What is the relationship between works and such diverse things as performances, manuscripts, scores, blueprints, stagings, film screenings, printing plates, data carriers, and others? What is the relationship between works and interpretations? In what way do works come into existence? Can works, once they are finished, be changed and/or cease to exist, and if so, under what conditions? Which sorts of parts can be distinguished within a work? Is the context of origin constitutive of a work’s identity? Can a translation be identical with the original linguistic work? Who is the author of a computer-generated work? The central thesis is that works of all kinds are abstract artefacts, i. e., types that are instantiated in concrete particulars, that is, in material or mental objects and events. The relationship between works and their “realizations” is defined by means of a modes of predication distinction, as it is used in a variety of Meinongian logics. An extensive chapter is dedicated to the relation between “representing works” and their represented worlds, with a focus on fictitious worlds and their objects. The latter are modeled as parts of fictional works. (shrink)

Thema der Arbeit ist der ontologische Status von Werken sowie die Beziehung zwischen Werken einerseits und Aufführungen, Manuskripten, Partituren, Schallplatten, Gemälden, Gebäuden, Drucken etc. andererseits. Es wird angeknüpft an den phänomenologischen Ansatz von Roman Ingarden (aber auch an den von Alexius Meinung). Diese Ansätze werden unter Verwendung moderner logischer Hilfsmittel weiterentwickelt und, wo notwendig, revidiert. Im ersten Kapitel wird ausführlich begründet, warum Werke (und zwar Werke aller Gattungen) abstrakte, typenartige Gegenstände sein müssen, die in konkreten Einzeldingen (z. B. Aufführungen) realisiert (...) sein können, jedoch von diesen Realisierungen in ihrer Existenz nicht abhängig sind. Diese These ist im weiteren Verlauf der Arbeit eine nicht mehr hinterfragte Grundvoraussetzung. Im zweiten Kapitel werden die formalen Grundlagen einer Typenontologie des Werks entwickelt. Zwei Hauptfragen stehen dabei im Vordergrund: (a) Wie kann ein Werk (also ein abstrakter Gegenstand) sinnliche Eigenschaften (z. B. Klangeigenschaften, Farbeigenschaften) haben? (b) Was macht einen Gegenstand zu einer Realisierung eines Werks? Welche Bedingungen müssen erfüllt sein, damit etwas eine Realisierung eines gegebenen Werks ist? Neben dem Begriff des Werks beruht die in dieser Arbeit entwickelte Theorie auf drei weiteren Grundbegriffen: Realisierungen, Konkretisierungen und Aktualisierungen. Realisierungen sind jene Gegenstände, in denen Werke realisiert sind. Konkretisierungen sind abstrakte Gegenstände, die durch "Vervollständigung" aus Werken hervorgehen. Sie sind immer noch unvollständig bestimmt, aber vollständiger bestimmt als die Werke, deren Konkretisierungen sie sind. Beispiele für Konkretisierungen sind Inszenierungen im Theater oder musikalische Interpretationen. Aktualisierungen sind die intentionalen Korrelate von Rezeptionsvorgängen. Sie entstehen im Verlauf der Rezeption eines Werks und werden von den Rezipienten erzeugt. Ein und dasselbe Werk kann auf verschiedene Weisen aktualisiert werden (z. B.: ein Musikstück kann auf verschiedene Weisen "gehört" werden). In eigenen Kapiteln werden Probleme der Mereologie, der Identität, des Darstellens und der Beziehung zwischen dem darstellenden Werk und dem Dargestellten erörtert. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is an ontological clarification of the concept of artefact. The following questions are addressed: 1. Do artefacts constitute an ontological category of objects in its own right, and if so, how could this category be characterized? 2. How do artefacts come into existence? 3. What kind of artefacts are there, and in which relations do they stand to each other? It is argued that artefacts are characterized essentially through their genesis and that they owe their (...) existence to mental acts of a particular kind, which I call “acts of creation”. It is maintained that there are not only concrete, material artefacts, but also abstract artefacts, that is, artefacts that cannot be perceived through the senses and are not located in space. Furthermore, it shall be claimed that in a sense those abstract artefacts are even primary to the concrete, material artefacts. (shrink)

The topic of this paper is the relationship between value facts (e.g., that this is good) and value experiences (e.g., appreciation). Its aim is, first, to give a concise account of the value theories of some important early phenomenologists (Franz Brentano, Christian von Ehrenfels, Alexius Meinong), second, to show that they raise questions and put forward arguments that are still worthy of note, and, third, to critically assess these arguments. Among others, the following questions are discussed: Can past and other (...) nonexistent objects have value? Are value experiences feelings or rather desires? Are value properties exemplified by “immanent objects” only? (shrink)

Those who are – in the tradition of Meinong – willing to accept the claim that there are objects that do not exist usually argue that the ontological commitment to nonexistent objects allows to resolve a variety of problems of reference and intentionality, such as: the problem of singular negative existential statements, the problem of discourse on past and future objects, the problem of discourse on fictitious objects, the problem of counterfactual existentials, the problem of allegedly necessary truths on nonexistent (...) objects (e. g., "The round square is round".) It seems that the ontological commitment to nonexistent objects enables us to explain both the obvious truth of many predicative sentences whose subject terms do not denote anything existent and the possibility of intentional acts whose objects do not exist. The aim of this paper is to show that the commitment to nonexistents does not resolve any of these problems. Furthermore, some alternative solutions are delineated. (shrink)

The general topic of this paper is the ontological commitment to so-called "fictitious objects", that is, things and characters of fictional stories, like Sherlock Holmes and Pegasus. Discourse about fiction seems to entail an ontological commitment to fictitious entities, a commitment that is often deemed inconsistent with empirical facts. For instance, "Pegasus is a flying horse" seems to entail "There are flying horses" as well as "Pegasus exists" (according to some widely accepted logical principles). I discuss two solutions that have (...) been proposed in the literature. The first one amounts to rejecting sentences like "Pegasus is a flying horse" as false, at least if they are taken at face value. This solution is called the "story operator strategy". It consists in paraphrasing sentences like "Pegasus is a flying horse" by means of the expression "according to a story" such that they are interpreted as an elliptic formulation of, e.g., "According to a story, Pegasus is a flying horse". I spell out the difficulties of the story operator strategy and opt for a realist ontology of fiction. A novel interpretation of the story operator "according to a story" is given, which is not only consistent with but even sheds new light on such a realist ontology. In particular, it is shown how the story operator can be used as a tool to introduce the so-called "modes of predication distinction" (which is an essential ingredient of many realist ontologies of fiction) in a commonsensical way. (shrink)

Autism has been defined as a disorder of social cognition, interaction and communication where ritualistic, repetitive behaviors are commonly observed. But how should we understand the behavioral and cognitive differences that have been the main focus of so much autism research? Can high-level cognitive processes and behaviors be identified as the core issues people with autism face, or do these characteristics perhaps often rather reflect individual attempts to cope with underlying physiological issues? Much research presented in this volume will point (...) to the latter possibility, i.e. that people on the autism spectrum cope with issues at much lower physiological levels pertaining not only to Central Nervous Systems (CNS) function, but also to peripheral and autonomic systems (PNS, ANS) (Torres, Brincker, et al. 2013). The question that we pursue in this chapter is what might be fruitful ways of gaining objective measures of the large-scale systemic and heterogeneous effects of early atypical neurodevelopment; how to track their evolution over time and how to identify critical changes along the continuum of human development and aging. We suggest that the study of movement variability—very broadly conceived as including all minute fluctuations in bodily rhythms and their rates of change over time (coined micro-movements (Figure 1A-B) (Torres, Brincker, et al. 2013))—offers a uniquely valuable and entirely objectively quantifiable lens to better assess, understand and track not only autism but cognitive development and degeneration in general. This chapter presents the rationale firstly behind this focus on micro-movements and secondly behind the choice of specific kinds of data collection and statistical metrics as tools of analysis (Figure 1C). In brief the proposal is that the micro-movements (defined in Part I – Chapter 1), obtained using various time scales applied to different physiological data-types (Figure 1), contain information about layered influences and temporal adaptations, transformations and integrations across anatomically semi-independent subsystems that crosstalk and interact. Further, the notion of sensorimotor re-afference is used to highlight the fact that these layered micro-motions are sensed and that this sensory feedback plays a crucial role in the generation and control of movements in the first place. In other words, the measurements of various motoric and rhythmic variations provide an access point not only to the “motor systems”, but also access to much broader central and peripheral sensorimotor and regulatory systems. Lastly, we posit that this new lens can also be used to capture influences from systems of multiple entry points or collaborative control and regulation, such as those that emerge during dyadic social interactions. (shrink)

States of affairs raise, among others, the following questions: What kind of entity are they (if there are any)? Are they contingent, causally efficacious, spatio-temporal and perceivable entities, or are they abstract objects? What are their constituents and their identity conditions? What are the functions that states of affairs are able to fulfil in a viable theory, and which problems and prima facie counterintuitive consequences arise out of an ontological commitment to them? Are there merely possible (non-actual, non-obtaining) states of (...) affairs? Are there molecular (i.e., negative, conjunctive, disjunctive etc.) states of affairs? Are there modal and tensed states of affairs? (shrink)

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I defend a strong version of actual intentionalism. First, I argue against meaning subjectivism, conventionalism and contextualism. Second, I discuss what I take to be the most important rival to actual intentionalism, namely hypothetical intentionalism. I argue that, although hypothetical intentionalism might be acceptable as a definition of the concept of utterance meaning, it does not provide an acceptable answer to the question of what determines an utterance’s meaning. Third, I deal with the most serious objection (...) against actual intentionalism, namely the failure objection. I argue that the failure objection can be overcome within a framework of full-blown actual intentionalism if one distinguishes between categorial and semantic intentions. Moreover, I show how this version of actual intentionalism accounts for the possibility of innovative metaphors and other implicatures. Finally, I demonstrate that actual intentionalism – thus construed – makes it possible to distinguish between communicative failures and the intentional breaking of conventions. (shrink)

The paper deals with the question whether musical works are created or discovered. In the preliminaries some ontological presuppositions concerning the nature of a musical work setting the stage for the whole debate and the Creationist and Platonist views are discussed. The psychological concepts of creation and discovery are distinguished from their ontological counterparts and it turns out that only the ontological ones are relevant in this context and that the Creationist arguments fail to prove the point in question. Finally (...) it is argued that there is not necessaryly a conflict between the positions of the creationist and the Platonist, if they are construed in an appropriate way. The Creationist view that to compose is to create and the Platonist that to compose is to discover are compatible, at least if creation is understood in a quite natural and common sense way. (shrink)

Eine ausgearbeitete Kunstontologie findet sich bei Ehrenfels nicht, wohl aber Bausteine zu einer solchen. Diese herauszuarbeiten ist das Anliegen des vorliegenden Beitrags. Dabei geht es um die Frage nach dem ontologischen Status von Kunstwerken, um mögliche kategoriale Einteilungen derselben, um Bestandteile und Identitätsbedingungen. Ehrenfels vertritt die Auffassung, dass nicht materielle Entitäten, sondern „Vorstellungskomplexe“ Träger ästhetischer Eigenschaften sind. Ich argumentiere, dass Ehrenfels die Auffassung zugeschrieben werden kann, dass Kunstwerke nicht mit materiellen Gegenständen, sondern mit Vorstellungskomplexen zu identifizieren sind. Im Weiteren wird (...) die Frage diskutiert, ob die Vorstellungskomplexe als mentale Entitäten im engeren Sinn aufzufassen sind (d. h. als Entitäten, die in jedem Moment ihrer Existenz von Bewusstseinsvorgängen ontologisch abhängig sind) oder ob sie von Bewusstseinsvorgängen unabhängige Existenz haben können. Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage wird ein wenig beachteter Text zur Gestalttheorie herangezogen, der eine überraschende Antwort nahe legt. Was die Frage nach den Bestandteilen betrifft, lässt sich aus Ehrenfels’ Schriften die Auffassung extrahieren, dass Kunstwerke aus Gestalten bestehen, die entweder durch sinnliche Qualitäten oder durch Psychisches fundiert sein können. Ich zeige zudem, dass Ehrenfels eine differenzierte Auffassung bezüglich der Identitätsbedingungen von Kunstwerken vertritt: In erster Linie sind die konstituierenden Gestalten identitätsrelevant, doch es können auch Kontexte und Funktionen eine Rolle spielen. (shrink)

In a paper entitled “Computer Composition and Works of Music: Variation on a Theme of Ingarden” (1988), Peter Simons explores some ontological problems that ensue from the use of certain forms of composition software, where the final outcome (the score) is the product of random processes within the computer. Such a method of composition raises, among others, the following questions: What kind of work (if any) has been created? Is it a work of music in the first place? Who is (...) the composer/author? Is it the software programmer, the user, the one who selects a particular score for public performance, the computer? What is the relationship of distinct products of the same programme? Are they instances of the same work? In this paper, I shall re-examine these questions. (shrink)

Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–1932) was a student of Franz Brentano and Alexius Meinong. The topic of this paper is Ehrenfels’ relation to Brentano, in particular Brentano’s influence on his philosophical work. After a sketch of Ehrenfels’ most important contributions to philosophy (which belong to the fields of philosophical psychology and value theory), I present those passages within Ehrenfels’ work in which he explicitly deals with Brentano. These concern, in particular, Brentano’s theory of love and hate as well as his theory (...) of intensity and his theory of preferring and adequate emotions. (shrink)

In "Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit" entwickelt Meinong seine Theorie der unvollständigen Gegenstände. Der Begriff der Unvollständigkeit wird eingeführt mittels expliziter Bezugnahme auf den Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten: Ein Gegenstand ist unvollständig genau dann, wenn für ihn der Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten nicht gilt. M. a. W.: x ist unvollständig, wenn nicht für jede Eigenschaft P gilt, daß x P hat oder daß x P nicht hat. Alle existierenden und bestehenden Gegenstände sind vollständig; Gegenstände wie das Dreieck in abstracto oder der (...) Gegenstand etwas Blaues sollen dagegen unvollständig sein. Meinong unterscheidet zwei Arten der Negation:(Ne) Es ist nicht der Fall, daß x p hat. (Externe Negation)(Ni) X hat nicht-P (Interne Negation)Meinong selbst stellt fest, daß in bezug auf die externe Negation der Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten uneingeschränkt gültig ist. Um zu verstehen, was es heißt, daß ein Gegenstand unvollständig ist, erscheint es daher unumgänglich, Klarheit darüber zu gewinnen, was eigentlich mit der internen Negation zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Es wird eine Interpretation der internen Negation vorgeschlagen, und es soll gezeigt werden, daß es gemäß dieser Interpretation überhaupt keine Gegenstände gibt, die unvollständig im Sinne Meinongs sind. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag werden drei Thesen verteidigt: 1. Interpretationen literarischer Werke (im Sinne von Aussagen über die Bedeutung literarischer Werke) können richtig oder falsch sein. 2. Werke haben eine objektive Bedeutung, unabhängig von Interpretationen. 3. Die Bedeutung eines Werks wird wesentlich durch die kommunikativen Absichten der Autorin determiniert. Die Position, dass Werk- und Textbedeutungen durch tatsächliche Autorabsichten des echten Autors konstituiert werden – die Position des aktualen Intentionalismus – wird gegen eine Reihe von Einwänden und konkurrierenden Theorien verteidigt, nämlich gegen (...) den Konstruktivismus (»Werke und Texte haben keinerlei Bedeutung unabhängig von einer Interpretation«), den Konventionalismus (»Die Werk- und Textbedeutung ist ausschließlich durch linguistische Konventionen determiniert«), den Kontextualismus (»Die Werk- und Textbedeutung ist ausschließlich durch den Äußerungskontext determiniert«) und den hypothetischen Intentionalismus (»Die Bedeutung eines Werks bzw. Textes ist identisch mit dem, was ein intendiertes bzw. ideales Publikum für die Bedeutung des Werks bzw. Textes halten würde«). (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag geht es um die Frage, ob wir aus fiktionalen literarischen Werken etwas lernen können. Können fiktionale literarische Werke uns Wissen vermitteln? Wenn ja, wie ist das möglich, und welche Art von Wissen vermitteln uns fiktionale Werke? Es wird argumentiert, dass fiktionale literarische Werke in der Tat Wissen vermitteln können, und zwar, unter anderem, propositionales Wissen über die “wirkliche Welt”.

In diesem Beitrag geht es um die Frage, ob wir aus fiktionalen literarischen Werken etwas lernen können. Können fiktionale literarische Werke uns Wissen vermitteln? Wenn ja, wie ist das möglich, und welche Art von Wissen vermitteln uns fiktionale Werke? Ich werde argumentieren, dass fiktionale literarische Werke in der Tat Wissen vermitteln können, und zwar, unter anderem, propositionales Wissen über die „wirkliche Welt“.

In "Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit" entwickelt Meinong seine Theorie der unvollständigen Gegenstände. Der Begriff der Unvollständigkeit wird eingeführt mittels expliziter Bezugnahme auf den Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten: Ein Gegenstand ist unvollständig genau dann, wenn für ihn der Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten nicht gilt. M. a. W.: x ist unvollständig, wenn nicht für jede Eigenschaft P gilt, daß x P hat oder daß x P nicht hat. Alle existierenden und bestehenden Gegenstände sind vollständig; Gegenstände wie das Dreieck in abstracto oder der (...) Gegenstand etwas Blaues sollen dagegen unvollständig sein. Meinong unterscheidet zwei Arten der Negation: Es ist nicht der Fall, daß x p hat. X hat nicht-P Meinong selbst stellt fest, daß in bezug auf die externe Negation der Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten uneingeschränkt gültig ist. Um zu verstehen, was es heißt, daß ein Gegenstand unvollständig ist, erscheint es daher unumgänglich, Klarheit darüber zu gewinnen, was eigentlich mit der internen Negation zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Es wird eine Interpretation der internen Negation vorgeschlagen, und es soll gezeigt werden, daß es gemäß dieser Interpretation überhaupt keine Gegenstände gibt, die unvollständig im Sinne Meinongs sind. (shrink)

This paper is a commentary on David Woodruff Smith's "Intentionality and Picturing: Early Husserl vis-à-vis Early Wittgenstein" (S J Phil 40 (Supp), 2002). I address three questions: 1. What is a fact according to Wittgenstein? What is the relation between states of affairs on the one hand and facts on the other? Is a fact an existing state of affairs (as Smith suggests), or is it the existence of a state of affairs, as most of Wittgenstein's remarks on this matter (...) in the _Tractatus suggest? The difference becomes especially important when negative facts are under consideration. 2. How far goes the parallelism between Husserl's and Wittgenstein's models of the thought-language-world relation really? In particular: Is there anything in Wittgenstein that corresponds to Husserl's ideal senses? Do Wittgenstein's thoughts play that role? 3. Do ideal senses have an explanatory function? (shrink)